How Russian intellectial justifies Crimean annexation

The International Affairs journal that positions itself as an intellectual media of the Russian Foreign Ministry is famous for its high quality materials. The following article "A right to self-determination, not for everyone" was published in the journal on April 27, 2016. Its author, Andrey Isaev, tries to show that Russian annexation of the Crimea was legitimate because there are cases in the modern world history when countries were allowed by the world community to occupy and annex territories.

First, the author is saying that he can't understand why Western countries demand from Russia to give up on the Crimea and stop interfering in the domestic affairs of the neighboring Ukraine.

"It is hard to understand why Russia became a part of the internal crisis in Ukraine and why Crimea should be returned to somewhere after clear declaration of its people will. But nevertheless it is how strange logic of the US and EU leaders look like."

Further the author makes a point that there are many cases in the world where modern states with a distinct history of state building have territorial disputes. The cases of Olivenca municipality, Gibraltar, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh are used to show that the Crimean crisis was not the only case in the recent history and such attention to the Russian policy is not justified and in fact artificially driven by the outside players.

Next, the author gets to analyzing two particularly interesting cases that in his view could be further used as additional justification to the Russian case. The war of 1967 between Arab states and Israel and subsequent Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights are a perfect example when a state "follows realpolitik, i.e. a policy with unconditional superiority of its national interests over the international law." For author, the timid reaction of the world community and especially of Israel's main ally, America, suggest that occupation is criticized by seen as legitimate. Indeed, author writes, Israel considers the Golan heights as strategically, politically and economically too important to think of their transfer to any Syrian government.

Another case is the Turkish occupation of the Cyprus in July 1974. Author underlines that despite being a NATO member back then Turkey wasn't punished by further sanctions and international isolation. Moreover, Turkish government now is conducting negotiations over visa-free travel with the European countries. 

Why is that? Why do Western countries oppose so staunchly Russian annexation of the Crimea, asks the author. 

"We should acknowledge that West has a grudge against Russia. All efforts against its policy were initiated at the moment when Russia's influence in the world began growing. After Russia got a status of a global player, Western countries got irritated and with time it became more evident."

It is still not clear why a mere fact of existence of several case when state decided to occupy a land should in any way justify Russian actions in Ukraine. I guess by citing two above mentioned examples author somehow wanted to hint that there was a political and economical or even humanitarian necessity to annex Crimea. In Israeli occupation of Golan as with the Turkish case of Cyprus occupation world community seems to acknowledge that occupation is a necessary step (even though illegal) to provide regional stability. It is hard to buy the same argumentation in the Russian case, especially if you take into consideration the ongoing build up of NATO efforts in the eastern Europe and civil war in Ukraine that can further draw the whole region into deeper standoff.


Turkey's IHH in Syria and the Middle East

The start of its activity dates back to the Bosnian war in the midst 1990s. According to the Wall Street Journal investigation activists who were responsible for running the Bosnian affiliate of the IHH served in the Bosnian Army's 7th Muslim Brigade, which back then served as umbrella commanding structure for the foreign Muslim volunteers fighting along the Bosnian locals. The IHH activity in the 1990s became a part of the French investigation into the terrorist activity of Hocine Bendaoui and Laïfa Khabou who tried to carry out a car bombing in 1996. According to the official investigation reports, the IHH allegedly was involved in providing of the logistical support for the perpetrators.[1] On July 12, 2010 Germany banned IHH local branch because of its financial support for the Hamas, who is classified as a terrorist organization by the German government. Then Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said the Frankfurt-based IHH abused donors' good intentions "to support a terrorist organization with money supposedly donated for charitable purposes."[2]

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, a think-tank close to the Israeli Intelligence, reported in 2011 that the IHH is closely linked to the Turkish government through close cooperation with state Center for International Cooperation and Development (Turk. TIKA)[3]. Hakan Fidan, who served between 2003-2007 as a head of the TIKA was appointed in May 2010 as chief of the Turkish intelligence and security service (Turk. MIT), an obscure state agency with a rapidly expanding budget ($560 millions in 2016)[4]. Prominence of MIT’s activity in recent years was caused by numerous reports on its activity in the Syrian conflict. In May 2015 Cumhuriyet newspaper published photos of trucks, allegedly belonging to the Intelligence Service, loaded with ammunition meant for Turkey friendly armed opposition in Syria[5]

Since the outbreak of war in Syria the IHH has been enjoyed a privileged treatment by the Turkish government. The organization in a short time managed to build a network of humanitarian facilities along the Turkish-Syrian borders providing food, shelter and assistance to the Syrian refugees. Justin Vela from the Foreign Policy reported in 2012 that the IHH’s activity was not confined with mere humanitarian relief. “It times, it plays a diplomatic role that the Turkish government simply cannot, given its open hostility to the Syrian government. In May, Sahin, one of the managers within the organization, traveled to Damascus along with IHH’s president, Bulent Yildirim, to negotiate the release of two Turkish journalists captured by regime forces”.[6]

International Crisis Group back in 2013 in its reports of the risks Turkey may face with a deepening crisis along its border noted that IHH’s more or less neutral position in the war may eventually expand Turkey’s capacity to lead events on the ground. The think-tank cites a case of successful negotiations run by the IHH that led to the exchange across active front lines of 48 Iranians held by the Syrian opposition for more than 2,000 rebels detained by the Syrian government.[7]

The IHH activists were involved in numerous cases where Turkish government allegedly tried to use the NGO’s trucks to deliver ammunition to the Syrian border under the disguise of humanitarian help. Most famous case was January 1, 2014 incident in Hatay province with a truck that was stopped by local police who later reported MIT officials were involved in ammunition transfer. Few hours later MIT officials and a truck were released upon intervention of the governor. Two weeks later police in several provinces raided IHH branches during raids against al-Qaeda networks in Turkey. The IHH name appeared in all these operations though, according to the Turkish political commentator Mustafa Akyol, “few people believed in this account of events. In the social media, thousands commented that the raid was in fact orchestrated by the members of the Gülen Movement within the police. They believed that the IHH was “targeted” for its links with the government, which was again “targeted” by the movement in question for political reasons.”

The non-governmental character of the IHH is one of the merits and reasons why Turkish government may want to exploit the organizations further in its involvement in the Syrian civil war. Government’s direct support for the opposition forces caused wrath of Ankara’s western partners and led to the broad debates domestically. Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan is considered to be a staunch opponent of Assad and seeks to support major opposition factions in Syria. In the face of Russian involvement and advancing Syrian army Ankara has long been considering an establishment of the safe zone near its borders that could protect Syrian opposition and host refugees. At the same time Ankara witness lack of enthusiasm about its safe zone proposal on part of its Western allies, Europe and US.

This very combination of factors may explain why Turkish government bets on the IHH in control of its borders and logistical activities. As The Brookings Institution and Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (Turk. USAK) experts agree “Turkish authorities have ingeniously come up with a policy that enables the extension of cross-border assistance without directly challenging the principle of Syrian national sovereignty. AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent and İHH play a critical role in managing this assistance. However, both the legal and practical bases of this policy remain very precarious.”[8] Marc Pierini, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Europe, confirms the observations and states that “the Turkish NGO IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation is setting up refugee camps on the Syrian side of the border as a way to enforce the safe zone the government in Ankara has long called for, but without any possibility of military protection, least of all from Turkish forces.”[9]

It is not totally clear, however, to what extend the IHH feels obliged to follow Ankara’s official line in Syria. The IHH high ranking officials despite its close connections to the government and AKP politicians allow afford to criticize Ankara on numerous occasions. The IHH’s head, Bulent Yildirim bashed government officials for normalizing of relation with Israel, hinted on the failed Kurdish policy of Ankara and expressed regret over newly signed refugee agreement between Turkey and the EU. Noah Blaser and Aaron Stein’s recent investigation in the The Islamic State’s Network in Turkey revealed connections between perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on the Turkish soil, and the Islamic State. The main important link between its Turkish branch and the IS in Syria was the IHH, who provided the activist, willingly or otherwise, an opportunity to travel via borders[10].

[8] The Brookings Institution, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)


The historic legacy still defines Turkish relations with the West

With two suicide attacks in the last two months in Ankara, Turkey is falling into more instability. Yet, in the face of danger coming from Kurdish militants, the Turkish government feels left alone by the West in its anti-terrorism measures. This could prompt Ankara to take high-risk steps to ensure its own security.

A few weeks back, on February 18, the Turkish capital Ankara was staggered by a suicide attack again. According to the official reports from Turkish General Staff, a “terrorist” targeted a service bus transporting off-duty military personnel, which resulted in 28 people dead and 61 wounded. In response, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was quick to blame the Democratic Union Party for the violence (kurd. PYD), which represents Syrian Kurds.

The recent attacks are yet another episode in the ongoing spiral of violence rocking the country. With geopolitical instability in the region, Syria and Iraq being on the verge of collapse and seemingly unending clashes between the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (kurd. PKK) and the Turkish government, similar attacks on Turkish soil are likely to happen again. Experts share this pessimism over the deteriorating security in the country.

The national government underlined on multiple occasions that Turkey is facing a double threat coming from PKK-separatists and Islamists from the “Islamic State” (IS). Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the suicide attacks carried out by IS and/or its sympathizers claim the biggest share of victims, Ankara avoids any direct engagement with the terrorist organization. Its reaction so far was limited to bombardments of insignificant positions of IS in Syria. Moreover, while Turkish police-forces periodically report on the arrests of people (allegedly) affiliated with IS, they do nothing to actually prevent their operations, such as political assassinations.

In its fight against Kurdish separatists, the Turkish government presents a completely different picture. On the battlefields, the PYD presented itself as a trustworthy partner of the international anti-IS coalition. In the same time, experts and political leaders were praising its efforts to contribute to social and political stability in northern Syria. Ankara is disturbed by such military and diplomatic successes of the PKK-affiliated PYD. Now that the world community is increasingly paying attention to the problems of Syrian Kurds, the government remains anxious that Turkey’s problems with its own Kurds would gain publicity and thus attract further criticism.

Turkey’s security dilemma and Rojava

From now on, stability inside Turkey is defined by the developments in Syria. Ankara’s reaction exposes deep concerns over its ability to keep the PKK further at bay. The Turkish government went on to incite new clashes with the urban military wing of the PKK in the eastern provinces. Turkey is even considering an invasion of its war torn neighbor Syria to prevent any further advancement by the Kurds from there. In addition, to forestall PYD’s territorial consolidation into a region called Rojava (kurd. for Western Kurdistan), Turkey tries to make its American partners cut all existing ties with the Syrian Kurds.

The Turkish President Recep Erdogan expressed his discontent over the close cooperation between Washington and the PYD and even suggested that the US could lose one of its partners in the Middle East unless it abandoned the policy of supporting the PYD-led Rojava region in northern Syria. Ankara seems ready to undertake serious measures to prevent the formation of any political entity on its borders that enjoys close ties to the PKK. In its response to the recent meeting of high-ranking US diplomats with PYD’s representatives, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned the American Ambassador John Bass to a meeting. Observers thus agree that Turkish-American relations are strained over the Syrian issue despite US efforts to mitigate disagreements.

The Turkey–Kurds–US triangle

The reason behind the souring of relations lies in Turkish fears of a Kurdish polity on its borders that would de-jure be autonomous and de-facto independent. The emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan during the Gulf war in 1991 was a historical precedent that the Turkish government seeks to avoid happening again: As such, Erdogan recently claimed that the decision of the Turkish Parliament from 2003 not to participate in the occupation of Iraq was a mistake. Had Turkey sent forces back then, it could have prevented Washington from further supporting Iraqi Kurdistan which is now formally a part of the federal Iraq.

The emergence of an independent Kurdish state in post-Saddam Iraq could lead to substantial changes inside Turkey itself. PKK fighters, taking advantage of the mountainous landscape of the border with Iraq, could attack Turkish security forces and retreat into the safe heavens of the Qandil Mountains. Already now, Turkey is witnessing its biggest nightmare coming true. To prevent the advancement of the PKK in the region, the Turkish government is forced to nourish cooperative ties with existing political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Ankara’s gradual recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan was possible thanks to American guarantees that Erbil, the capital of the autonomous region, will not demand full independence from Baghdad. Clearly, Turkey has so far believed in America’s ability to control political forces in Iraq and Kurdistan and to thereby limit the Kurds’ ambitions. Thus, despite the deteriorating US-Turkish relations and the ensuing uncertainty about the region’s future, the Turkish government still expects the US to control Kurds in Syria as it does in Iraq. Turkey not only realizes that the political situation on the ground in Syria is increasingly affecting its own domestic security but also that its actions against the PKK are limited. That is why Ankara is so persistent in demanding assurances from the US that there will not be an independent Kurdish state in Syria.

What Turkey fails to understand in all this, however, is that the ongoing cooperation between Washington and Syrian Kurds is based on their coinciding interests, not on long term considerations. Both sides will inevitably clash over the question of the unification of Kurdish areas in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Moreover, Kurds are not pleased with the fact that US military assistance in the fight against Islamists from al-Nusra and IS is not accompanied with diplomatic support with regards to Kurdish aspirations to autonomy. Kurds under PYD leadership therefore seek to diversify their relations with major stake holders in the region, like Russia, to get away from dependence on the US.

The Occidentalism in today’s Turkey

Ankara’s trust in the US seems to be rooted in the almost mythological notion that no political actors can act without the idea of a collective West, the generalized Occident, if you will. According to wide segments of Turkish society, all recent political happenings in the Middle East – such as the uprisings across the Arab region in 2011, the deposal of Egyptian presidents Mubarak and Mursi, the Gezi protests in Istanbul in 2013, the emergence of IS and PYD – happened with direct participation of the West.

Both the ignorance of the existing cobweb of interdependent political players in the Middle East and the desire to see hidden Western designs in everything that is happening in the region are to a great extent rooted in the legacy of Turkey’s history. It goes back to the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of the Turkish republic, which found itself occupied by the Entente States at the end of the First World War. The imperial government was forced to sign the ill-fated Sèvres Peace Accord in 1920 which envisaged all Ottoman colonies to be put under direct control of France and England while the core territories of Anatolia were to be occupied by the European expeditionary forces. Through victories on the battlefields during the War of Independence (1919-1923), the government of the newly proclaimed Turkish Republic was able to review the provisions of the treaty which eventually was transformed into the more acceptable Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923.

Even though strongman Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was rapidly working towards a transformation of the new republic to make it become a part of the civilized (read: European) world, mistrust towards the West and paranoid obsessions about Western conspiratorial plans to divide the country remained firmly entrenched in the public mind.

The so-called Mosul Question made the new Turkish government realize for the first time that Western countries were not interested in compromising with regard to Turkey’s vital interests and their own’s. In 1924, upon a decision of the Council of the League of Nations, Turkey was forced to acknowledge the oil-rich territory around the city of Mosul, a former province of the Ottoman Empire, to be a part of the Iraqi state. Yet, this decision was pushed through by Britain which, back then, administered Iraq. The next blow to Turkey’s trust into Western sincerity was inflicted by the Cyprus Crisis in the 1960 and 70s, when the US rejected Turkish proposals to stabilize the situation on the island. Against this backdrop, Ankara’s decision to invade Cyprus in 1974 was dictated by the strong attempt to prevent further intercommunal clashes and specifically attacks on the Turkish residents of the island.

Implication for the near-term future

Seen in this historical light, the “Sèvres Syndrome” today can be described as an established opinion among broad segments of the Turkish society about the West as the only political power that exerts control in the Middle East. As such, Western states are conceived as a single actor who aims to further divide Turkey – in particular by establishing an independent Kurdistan.

That Turkey is still in the grip of the “Sèvres Syndrome” is indicated, for example, by reactions of the political elite on the current state of affairs in Northern Syria. Both the long-lasting war there as well as the rapid expansion of the Syrian Kurds is represented as a direct result of Western interventions. In effect, Turkey is getting ever more frustrated about the fruitlessness of its efforts to defend its own interests and continues to worry that Kurdish expansion in Syria may, eventually, result in the loss of the Turkish territory.

Thus, this feeling of isolation coupled with the prevalent “Sèvres Syndrome” can in the long run push Turkey into pursuing more hazardous policies in Northern Syria. In turn, this may lead to the direct clash with Russian interests and prompt a wider conflict between major stake-holders in the Syrian civil war.