With
increased violence and instability in the Middle East in the aftermath of the
Arab Spring Turkish foreign policy has been a hot topic in the international
media and forums. In the last two years Turkey’s role in regional politics has
been increasingly scrutinized in association with activity of yet another
rising power. Both Russia and Turkey, whose elites are sharing so many similarities
in worldview and approaches to the outside world, act united in their
resolution to put their bilateral relations on strategically coherent and rigid
foundation.
Conditions
for deeper cooperation are right as never before. Both powers are enjoying
ambivalent relations with Western partners. Besides, Turkey and Russian, since
the end of Cold war, have been trying to diversify their relations and move
away from cumbersome dependence on Europe. Against this background the concept
of Eurasianism has been long viewed as a long-sough ideational platform that
can further cement Russian-Turkish ties and create effective drive for
civilizational alliance that would resist Western pressure.
After
the end of bipolar global confrontation in the early 1990s Turkey and Russia
discovered in each other perspective partners in many areas, especially trade,
tourism, construction and energy projects. But it is only in the late 2000s with
establishment of the High-Level Cooperation Council in May 2010 Ankara and
Moscow could finally overcome residual mistrust and started approaching each
other in more strategic issues expanding their experience on Eurasian political
space.
Statements
by Turkish and Russian officials may serve as a prove that both sides consider expanding
bilateral ties into multilateral cooperation focused on Eurasian integration
projects. In November 2013, during the bilateral High-Leven Cooperation Council
meeting Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed[1]
an idea of Turkey entering the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and free trade
agreements with the Eurasian countries as a way to rebalance unsuccessful
membership talks with EU. Signals were later repeatedly sent
even after the S-24 jet crisis. In August 2017, after having gain no progress
over renewals of terms with the European Customs Union Turkish officials once
again pointed[2]
at possibility of Turkey seeking alternatives in Eurasian integration projects
like the Eurasian Customs Union that unites markets of
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
Even though, one may speculate that
many statements made by Turkish officials in their essence remain declaration,
there are instances where Turkish government undertake practical steps in
boosting closer economic ties with Eurasian countries. Since 2008 Turkey has
been implementing[3] a
number of projects, mainly infrastructural like Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway[4],
that aim to prepare integration of Turkish economy in trade projects with China
and Central Asian republics within the framework of One Belt One Road
Initiative. Meanwhile Moscow tends to make statements that both criticize
Western political dominance[5]
while singling out Turkey as a non-Western power that would be suitable for
cooperation and participation in allegedly Russian-led initiatives[6].
Trend
to push bilateral relations into more ideologically refined, Eurasianist
framework may have historical rationale. Both Turkey and Russia share
experience of imperial past and related longing for a glorious old times. After
the collapse of their perspective imperial polities, political process of
Russia and Turkey has been defined by efforts of national elites to modernize a
nation and carry out reforms that would enable them to compete with European
and later Western powers on equal terms. Catch-up modernization projects,
though with different trajectories, in Russia and Turkey may have contributed
to convergence between Moscow and Ankara during the 20th century,
even despite the fierce ideological confrontation.
Turkey
and Soviet Union in the 1920s were considering each other perfect partners to
overcome dangerous isolation of their newly established political regimes by
European power and USA. Rapallo[7]
and Sevres[8]
syndrome played later a decisive role in attempts of Ankara to seek cooperation
and solidarity of Moscow when its own ties with America soured. With waning
hostility of the Cold war, Turkey and Soviet Union managed to forge a very
sophisticated goods-for-gas agreement in 1984 marking a firm beginning of
deeper economic cooperation[9].
But
it is not only common historical legacy and similar path of modernization, but
also common challenges of today that push Turkey and Russia towards each other.
The geopolitical shifts of the post-Cold war order put tremendous pressure on
security and foreign policy of both powers. With stabilization of national
economies in Russia and Turkey in later 1990s both endeavored to expand their footprint
in their close geographical neighbourhood, in regions where historical and cultural
legacy would facilitate their penetration. Activism of the 2000s of these new
rising powers made some political circles believe that old world is waning under
the rising influence of new, Eurasian powers like Russia, Turkey, China and
others.
A
further force that brought Turkey and Russia together was expansion of
democratic freedoms in both countries after 1990s, decline of the
democratization efforts and eventual drift toward authoritarianism in the
2010s. Today, political regimes in Turkey[10]
and Russia[11]
can be described as hybrid regimes with competitive authoritarian features with
ostensibly functioning democratic institutions with ruling party or leaders
exerting pressure on opposition and control via informal channels but without
sliding into an outright authoritarianism that would be neither internationally
acceptable nor productive in conditions where national economies depend on the
outside world.
Problems
with democratic process, rule of law, human rights and freedoms has been long
drawing criticism from Europe and United States. Underlying logic behind
Western attempts to anchor democratic rule in Turkey and Russia may be
expressed by desire to see more predictable, cooperative and ideologically friendly
regimes that would further contribute to promotion of these norms and values in
their adjacent regions: Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Eastern Europe. On
the other hand, Western attempts to secure democratic achievements of the
previous years and to support civil society are regarded by ruling political
elites today as direct intrusion in domestic affairs[12],
yet another foreign policy challenge that unites Turkey and Russia.
Within
these conditions, circles led in Russia by Alexander Dugin[13]
and by Doğu Perinçek[14]
in Turkey while being bestowed by benevolence of the rulers eager to talk about
a common idea that would unite Russian and Turkish activism for the sake of
their better and firmer resistance to the Western attempts to subdue these
nations. Roots of the Eurasian ideology go back to the early 20th century
when Russian intellectuals tried
to redefine roots of state crisis of the Russian Empire and to assess results
of the Bolshevik revolution that gave rise to the new geopolitical colossus,
Soviet Union. Eurasianists came to a conclusion that Russia represents not a nation,
but a civilization that unites all local nations in the vast territories of
Eurasia. In its essence this ideology was a reformulated tradition of Russian
Slavic nationalism.
Today (Neo)-Eurasianism tends to
describe efforts of states to develop an indigenous framework of cooperation,
usually as an alternative to the Western capitalist dominance. Russian and
Turkish official circles tend to pay credit Eurasianism as a practical
ideological framework for mutual cooperation for several crucial reasons. First
of all, Eurasianists by saying that all version of national democracies have
right to existence[15],
in essence, emphasize idea of sovereignty and vehemently reject interference
into domestic affairs. Besides, Eurasianists’ focus on existing alternatives to
the Western values and norms of international conduct add legitimacy to Russian
and Turkish criticism of Western partners and on a rhetorical level improve
their negotiating positions in talks over terms of dialogue with the West.
But looking
into real world manifestation
of the Eurasianist narrative reveals serious gaps. Tendency to ascribe
Eurasianism a driving force behind rapprochement seems to be a myth or
alternatively doesn’t seem to be a reliable driving force of bilateral ties
that are loaded with hidden competition[16]
in the Central Asia, Black Sea, Caucasus and Syria. Moreover, advocates of
Eurasianism in Turkey and Russia understand different things under this term[17]:
for Russian Eurasianists that means ideology that today is called to legitimize
Russian presence in its neighborhood whereas for Turkish Eurasianists it tends
to mean a foreign policy strategy that is focused on developing effective tools
against Western pressure. Finally, Eurasian rhetoric serves the purpose to mask transactional and situational
character of bilateral relations, evidenced by the S-400 deal and cooperation
in Syria.
While Russian
and Turkish officials show desire to talk about underlying ideological foundation
of the rapprochement it nevertheless evident that both countries are more
inclined to advance ties with Western world. Volume of trade between Turkey and
European Union in 2016 was at the level of USD 145 billion[18],
while its Russian-Turkish trade hit a mark of USD 21,6 billion in 2017[19].
Unbalanced trade structure (with Russian energy exports enjoying better
positions) and economic relations force Turkey and Russia talk about bilateral
ties in more abstract terms by describing their relations as part of bigger
Eurasian project. Moreover, in cultural terms population of the both states
feel more affiliated with Europe rather than with each other. Both Russia and
Turkey have each large community in European countries.
Attempts
of Russia and Turkey to dress bilateral relations in more rigid ideational
framework are understandable. Still, Turkey and Russia can’t build future of
their relations on anti-Western narrative. Paradoxically, it is their common
movement towards European community that may advance cooperation: historical
process of entering the European civilization established better rules of diplomatic
conduct while providing guarantees from braking the laws by the other side.
Within this movement each of the both powers feels more secure knowing that all
they share common ideas and values like rule of law, democracy and human
rights. These commonalities may further
increase tolerance to inter-dependence and compromise in critical areas and
help Turkey and Russia to overcome rather than ignore their historical legacy
of mistrust.
[3] Bir Kuşak Bir Yol Girişimi Çerçevesinde
Türkiye-Çin İlişkileri, Ankara
Kriz ve Siyset Araştırmaları Merkezi, July 15, 2017.
[6] Comment
by the Information and Press Department on the sixth meeting of the Joint
Strategic Planning Group, Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 2018.
[8] Forget
Sykes-Picot. It’s the Treaty of Sèvres That Explains the Modern Middle East, Foreign
Policy, August 10, 2015.
[9] Turkey
takes a tentative step toward Soviet Union by signing trade agreement, The Christian Science
Monitor, December 27, 1984.
[10] Esen,
B., & Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Third
World Quarterly, 37(9), 1581-1606.
[11] Shevtsova,
L. F., & Eckert, M. H. (2001). Russia's hybrid regime. Journal of Democracy,
12(4), 65-70.
[14] Perinçek, D. (1996). Avrasya seçeneği:
Türkiye için bağımsız dış politika. Kaynak
Yayınları, 1996.
[15] Averre,
D. (2007). " Sovereign Democracy" and Russia's relations with the
European Union. Demokratizatsiya,
15(2), 173.
[16] Svarin,
D. (2015). Towards a Eurasian axis? Russia and Turkey between cooperation and
competition. Global
Affairs, 1(4-5), 381-398.
[19] Comment
by the Information and Press Department on the sixth meeting of the Joint
Strategic Planning Group, Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 2018.
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