From Astana XII to Adana II: what needs to be done to revive the Syrian-Turkish dialogue

Turkey does not need permits to conduct operations against terrorists, Erdogan says these days, meanwhile Turkish officials are actively negotiating with the United States and Russia on the parameters of the border security zone envisaged by Ankara in northern Syria. Obviously, Russia recognizes Turkey’s concerns regarding the Syrian Kurdish armed groups. The goal of Moscow today is to tame and redirect Ankara’s ambitions towards the restoration of dialogue with official Damascus. Putin’s on January 23 meeting with Erdogan stated that Adana Agreement of 1998 could be the basis for resumption of interstate cooperation on security issues. Russia is thus required to contribute to reviving the spirit of trust in the region.

Today, no one in Turkey doubts the positive contribution of the Adana Agreement to the security of the region. The terms negotiated in October 1998 obliged Damascus to abandon the support of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (aka PKK). The Syrian authorities recognized the PKK as a terrorist entity, promising by all means to help stop its activities in Syria and neighboring Lebanon. Under pressure from the Turkish authorities, Syria expelled the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan who was later apprehended by Turkish intelligence service. Bilateral cooperation continued up until mid-2011s, when Turkey, with the beginning of the civil war in Syria, began openly supporting opposition forces in attempts to topple Assad. Despite an almost seven-year pause in bilateral cooperation, the Turkish government today recognizes the urgent need to restore work within the framework of the Adana Agreement.

However, the Turkish officials continue to criticize the Syrian authorities for non-compliance with the agreement's terms. Syria tries to carry on negotiations with the Syrian Kurds led by the Party of Democratic Union, which Ankara considers an intrinsic part of the PKK. According to Turkey, the Syrian authorities not only abstain from dully performing taken under the Adana Agreements to fight the Kurdish separatist organization, but, moreover, openly assist it, as it was in February last year in the Syrian Afrin region during the Turkish military operation “Olive branch".

The restoration of dialogue is also hampered by the position of the Turkish leadership in regards to the legitimacy of the current Syrian president. Ankara insists that any talks of cooperation should be carried out with the legitimate Syrian government, which can be formed only after political reforms are carried out and elections are held in the country under the supervision of the international community. Interestingly, the Turkish representatives at the same time avoid mentioning ongoing contacts that two countries are already cooperating in the field of fight against terrorism.

Turkey’s concerns also caused by the political future of the border areas, which must return to the control of the Syrian government if the Adana Agreement is given a second chance. Ankara’s position is affected by deep distrust of Assad: after 7 years of confrontation with neighboring Turkey, the Syrian president, guided by the tactics of his father Hafez Assad, can once again start supporting the PKK as a leverage against the Turkish government. A separate issue in Turkey's calculations deals with the possible resumption of repressions against refugees returning to northern Syria.

It is interesting that against this background of the coherent position of the Turkish government, which declares the importance of the Adana Agreements, but refuses to recognize the Syrian government as a partner, Turkish opposition proposes its own options for normalizing the Syrian policy of Turkey. For example, Republican People’s Party, among other things, calls for the immediate start of a dialogue with Damascus, implementation of agreements with Russia and Iran in Idlib and maintenance of a dialogue between the Syrian authorities and Kurdish political parties (apparently implying that it is in the interests of Ankara to support any negotiations between Syrian Kurds not affiliated with PYD and Damascus in order to minimize political influence of the PKK).

At the same time, political ally of the Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan, Devlet Bahçeli and his far-right Nationalist Movement Party, although urging to refrain from dialogue with Assad, still hint that any agreements with the Syrian government in the circumstances of extreme need should take into account the special demands of Turkey and recognize Turkey's influence gained in recent years in the Syrian political process.

One can assume in this light that Bahçeli and his party are forced to follow the official line in the Syrian issue in order not to harm the “People’s Alliance” created with Erdoğan’s ruling establishment. After all, domestic political benefits derived from membership in a pro-government alliance keep nationalists from taking a position on the Syrian conflict that is too different from the official stance of Ankara.

One should also keep in mind that under the influence of failures in Syria, Turkey’s Middle East policy is undergoing major changes. First, there is a collision of two mutually exclusive processes inside Turkey's foreign policy decision-making process. The politicization of purely non-political areas of bilateral relations with the countries of the neighboring region, when economic, cultural and diplomatic ties are sacrificed for the sake of political ambitions and whims of the ruling elites, is replaced by a process of further securitization, when Ankara approaches bilateral cooperation mainly from a position of acute need to ensure national security.

Secondly, Turkey’s approach to solving problems in the region is increasingly approached from a position of strength and unilateral actions. If, in the matter of coordinating actions and coordinating the positions, Turkey managed to establish a dialogue with Iran and Russia, it had to be content with at least a cold silence in relations with Arab countries, especially with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The problem of the partial isolation of Ankara in the region is complicated by the difficult relations of the country with its Western military-political partners.

Not surprisingly, the above-mentioned state of affairs in Turkish foreign policy forced the government to actively support the Astana process, which began in January 2017. The emphasis on stabilizing the armed conflict through consultations of the most important stakeholders, attention to the provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions, as well as attempts to start the political process - all this allowed Turkey to ponder over its true national interests, assess its potential within new political conditions in the region and find new opportunities in Syria.

It is expected that at the upcoming meeting on February 14, the Astana Troika will discuss the withdrawal of American troops from northern Syria. Until now, the United States diplomats, in official contacts with its Turkish colleagues, advocated a formula for resolving the security problem of the border area that is not entirely acceptable to Ankara. The American side is ready to recognize the right of Turkey to conduct operations in northern Syria in the outback of 32 km, while Ankara should provide guarantees that the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party will not be the goal of the Turkish military. But this precondition is not only unacceptable for Turkey, but also makes the plans of the limited military operation meaningless, and the potential casualties among Turkish servicemen pointless, since it would not contribute to the elimination of the terrorist threat.

The clinch between Washington and Ankara in regards to the situation in northern Syria provides a unique opportunity for Russian diplomacy to assist the ongoing attempts to resume official relations between Turkey and Syria. First of all, Russia needs to influence the process of making foreign policy decisions in Turkey: Erdogan’s ambitions to create a security zone can be leveled by Erdogan’s pragmatism. The ruling elites and their political allies within the political establishment can together put pressure on the president if, in general, the cooperation mechanism with Syria will be able to serve Turkey’s national interests in the sense in which they are represented by the Turkish nationalist and patriotic circles within academia, military and bureaucracy.

In consultation with the Turkish side on the issue of restoring dialogue with Damascus, attention should be paid to the regional nature of cooperation, in which the problems of the region are to be solved only by the countries of the region itself. The anti-imperialist connotation of the initiative will fit well with the growth of anti-American sentiment in Turkey and the experience of anti-terrorism cooperation with Iraq and Iran.

On the other hand, the statements of the Syrian side regarding the recognition of Hatay province as a sovereign territory of Turkey, recognition of Turkey as a priority partner in the matter of the early return of Syrian refugees and the restoration of cross-border trade - all this can also contribute to attempts to bring the Turkish leadership out of a state of hesitation and promote resumption of bilateral dialogue.

Further reading:


Russia's plan for PKK-PYD: what will Moscow offer Ankara?

by Salih Yilmaz

How does Russia evaluate decision of the United States on the withdrawal of its troops from Syria?

The statement by US President Donald Trump to withdraw American forces from Syria, announced by him on December 19, 2018, forced active participants to the Syrian resolution process to reconsider their perspective strategies.

From the point of view of Russia, before the proclamation of this decision in Syria, there was a certain balance of power. And after the withdrawal of US troops, this balance was destroyed not in favor of Russia. According to the assessment of Russian experts (and the approach of the country's leaders does not differ from it), the decision of the USA to withdraw from Syria is an attempt to mislead everyone. It can be assumed that the countries of the region should now seek withdrawal from Syria of the Russian forces as well, but it is obvious that Russia does not intend to abandon its military presence in this country so far.

Russia is ready to consider options for exclusion from Assad process if a suitable alternative is found.

The allegations that Russia will not stop supporting the Assad regime are not entirely true, since Moscow, in principle, may agree to replace Assad with another player if all parties to the peace settlement support Assad’s withdrawal and his successor will not conduct an anti-Russian policy . It is even noted that in 2016, Russia was searching for alternatives to Assad, but no candidate agreed to this role. For Russia, the most important thing is to make sure Assad and other candidates don't pursue an anti-Russian strategy and for do not create a power vacuum in the country. In fact, Turkey’s confident refusal to cooperate with Assad makes Russia think about new candidates for creating strong Syria in the future.

Russia's opposition to PKK-PYD activity in the east of the Euphrates is similar to Turkey’s position

The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his New Year’s message to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, noted that thanks to the joint efforts of Moscow and Ankara, contributes greatly to the fight against terrorism in Syria and strengthens security in Eurasia, says a lot, including PKK -PYD and Idlib. In particular, this statement shows that the positions of Turkey and Russia may differ on some issues, both countries nevertheless refrain from a policy capable of putting each other in a difficult position.

Russia, of course, does not approve of the increased activity of Turkey in the region after the United States leaves Syria, but if it has to choose between Turkey and the United States, then it will prefer Turkey.

What will Russia offer Turkey in the PKK-PYD issue ? What are its plans?

In negotiations with Turkey, Russia offers above all the transition of the territory where PKK-PYD is active, under the control of the Assad regime. At the same time, the PKK-PYD terrorists will have to surrender their weapons, all members of the organization who are not local residents will be withdrawn from the country, and Russian forces will guard the Turkish-Syrian border. Russia proposes to provide this protection with the help of Muslim soldiers from Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, as is the case in Manbij, Aleppo and Deraa.

During a visit to Moscow of one of the leaders of PKK-PYD in Syria, Sipan Hamo, these conditions were offered to him, but they did not receive approval. PKK-PYD does not wish to lay down their arms and neither does they consider it appropriate to talk about withdraw from the country of those members who are not originally residents of Syria. The leaders of PKK-PYD themselves offer Russia conditional submission to Assad, but at the same time they want to retain the armed forces that will control the territories under their control.

The fact that Russia prefers to meet with Syrian Kurd Sipan Hamo, and not with Ilham Ahmed and Asya Yusuf, the leaders of PKK-PYD in Syria who came from Qandil mountains and are not Syrians, tell us something. It is known that Russia is a mediator in the negotiations between PKK-PYD and Assad. However, this mediation includes options for the continued existence of Assad, rather than strengthening the power of PKK-PYD, as in the United States. Russia does not oppose the cultural political autonomy of the Kurds in the east of the Euphrates. But Moscow is against the armed elements in this autonomy. It is emphasized that negotiations are possible if PKK-PYD transfers all weapons to the regime forces and agrees to a political cultural autonomy. Although Russia, in negotiations with PKK-PYD, takes into account Turkey’s scrupulousness and demands that all foreign elements sent from Qandil leave Syria for the time being, this is not possible, because the proposals of the United States are more acceptable to the PKK, according to which cultural political autonomy, and for this there is no need to surrender weapons.

It is believed that some 4,000–5,000 PKK-PYD members in the east of the Euphrates, who are not indigenous to Syria, can be sent to Iraq. As an example of this, they cite a plan to neutralize the terrorist elements in the Makhmur camp between northern Iraq and Turkey. But it seems that this plan cannot be used by the leadership of northern Iraq, since there are fears that it will not be possible to send about 4,000 members of PKK to northern Iraq and “dissolve” them among the Peshmerga. In this case, there is a risk that they, being opposed to Barzani, may cause a crisis. Moreover, such a plan will not be adopted by Barzani without the permission of the United States.

Although there are disputes over the idea of ​​creating a buffer zone by disarming PKK-PYD by Russia on the Turkish border, stripping the country of foreign terrorists and creating a Muslim police force, this idea is unacceptable for Turkey. So far, Russia does not oppose Turkey’s military operation in the territory from Ain El-Arab to Al-Maliki, not reaching the south of Al-Hasaki. However, starting from the border of Hasakoy, Russia wants to create a buffer zone. Under this plan, after the elimination of PKK-PYD with the cooperation of Turkey and Russia, they want to transfer the region under the control of Assad.

Turkey considers Russia's proposal well-intentioned, but its implementation is not possible because Turkey does not intend to trust the security of its borders to the initiative of another country or Assad. Although Russia gives guarantees about PKK-PYD, no one can guarantee that the PKK-PYD card will not be used in the future by Assad or other external actors.

Turkey, considering the Syrian issue, takes into account not only the PKK-PYD, but also the inhabitants of the region, who need to be freed from the persecution of Assad. The transfer of the Assad forces by Turkey to the region will mean that all the policies pursued by Turkey up to now have been in vain and that they will have to give up their convictions.

Russia’s proposals for the preservation of the Assad regime are unlikely to be approved by Turkey. Instead, Russia should ensure coordination with Turkey and rely on it more than Assad.

Russia and Iran have offered to include in the format of Astana and the east of the Euphrates

The implementation of Russia's proposals to continue the process after the withdrawal of American troops in the framework of the Astana talks is also not possible, because the Astana format is based on the process of political settlement in Syria as part of the termination of clashes. For Turkey, it is important that its security threats emanating from the terrorist organization in the east of the Euphrates be eliminated, and that neither PKK-PYD nor Assad should make local people suffer. Since this is directly related to Turkey, the policy of Russia and Iran also causes objections from other external subjects that may hamper Turkey’s operations. It seems that the United States and Israel will not be able to put up with the influence of Iran in the region.

The inclusion of Russia in the equation and Iran may be necessary for Russia to balance with the United States and Israel. But for Turkey, this situation may harm the fight against PKK-PYD. The Turkish public will not agree with the scenario in which PKK-PYD and Assad will continue to be players in the region.

Further reading:

Russia wants to decide on a buffer zone in Syria collectively with Turkey

On Wednesday, January 23 presidents of Russia and Turkey held negotiations in Moscow. A whole range of complex issues were on the table. A year ago, Turkish troops launched an operation to clear the Syrian Afrin from armed Syrian Kurdish groups which are hostile to Ankara. Today, Turkish government is again on the verge of starting another border operation in Syria. The country's leadership has been devising plans to create a buffer zone along the eastern part of the Turkish-Syrian border in the hope of deepening cooperation with the United States. The calculation is simple: through dialogue with the United States, Turkey wants to balance its Syrian policy, which has recently given a lurch towards Russia. The agenda in the framework of Erdogan’s visit is the question of whether Russia, without pushing Turkey away, can keep its partner in the Syrian settlement within the framework of collective cooperation.

Toward the end of the outgoing year, the US President in a video message to the citizens announced the imminent withdrawal of American troops from Syria. Many responded to Trump’s statement with surprise, but not the Turkish leadership. For Turkey, as Erdogan tried to explain in his article to the New York Times, the withdrawal of 2,000 American soldiers from the territories controlled by Syrian Kurds is a great opportunity to solve problems that have long poisoned relations between Ankara and Washington.

It is not surprising that Turkey, forced to move in Syria in the shadow of Russian diplomatic initiatives, enthusiastically began to look for a suitable format for the resumption of a constructive dialogue with Americans. Representatives of the US military-political circles managed to cut the hopes of the Turkish authorities by all means trying to limit the potential of Turkey to determine the processes taking place at points that are critical for American interests in Syria.

Decision of the president on withdrawal of troops gradually became filled with a feasible content. Linking the withdrawal to political conditions, including security guarantees for the Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party, which Ankara regards as one of the objectives of the military operation, has caused adjustments to the diplomatic line of conduct of the Turkish government. In addition, Turkey was forced to avoid making statements about how its relations with Damascus and Iran would be built after Washington cedes control over northern Syria to Ankara.

Against this background, as a compromise format for the future of the Turkish-American cooperation in the next few months, during which the withdrawal of troops is supposed to take place, the formation of a buffer zone with a depth of 32 km under the control of Turkey was indicated. Ankara declares that the military cross-border operation is, by and large, expedient, fully meets the existing challenges and is justified by the requirements of security.

Nevertheless, in the plans of Ankara to create the next pro-Turkish zone on the Syrian border, you can see a lot of white spots. First of all, Turkey does not provide a satisfactory explanation of what awaits the Syrian Kurds, who, moreover, do not intend with folded arms to observe the loss of the next territories of their self-proclaimed autonomy.

There is also no certainty regarding the nature of the cooperation between Washington and Ankara in the proposed buffer zone. Not only Russia, Iran, Damascus, but also the internal political allies of the Turkish government are against the emergence of a US-Turkish protectorate in Syria. According to the leader of the Turkish nationalists, who are part of Erdogan’s party in an informal coalition agreement, the cabinet’s attempt to cooperate with the United States in Syria could turn into the appearance of the next Kurdistan on Turkey’s borders.

Obviously, Turkish leadership, which seeks to establish unconditional control over the entire Syrian-Turkish border, does not have much room for diplomatic maneuvers. In such conditions, dialogue between Ankara and Moscow acquires special significance. Turkey will obviously try to convince Moscow that the strengthening of the Turkish presence in northern Syria will not threaten their joint initiative to resolve the Syrian conflict. Erdogan’s visit to Moscow should clarify the countries ’position regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Syria and the development of the situation on the ground in the future.

Over the past month, Russia has shown by actions that it intends to adhere to its line on the issue, namely, transferring all the liberated territories under the control of the Syrian government and solving security problems through dialogue between Damascus and Ankara. In this regard, news of the start of patrols by the Russian military police in the Manbij area and the visit of Syrian Kurds to Moscow should have sent a powerful signal to the Turkish side: Russia’s confidence in Turkey remains, but from now on all actions of the guarantor countries should be carried out within the framework of agreements reached with particular attention to respect for the sovereignty of Syria with the prerogative of the interests of the central government.

Obviously, Russia values ​​cooperation with Turkey. Even despite all the problems in Idlib, Turkey was able to prevent further clashes between the government and the opposition on this territory, allowing them to focus on political dialogue. A separate point can be noted the cessation of attacks of UAVs on Russian military installations. This happened after the strengthening of the role of Turkey in Idlib. Ankara’s positive contribution is also felt in the issue of the formation of two of the three lists of the constitutional commission, on whose work Moscow places great hopes.

The fact that the Turkish leadership is actively coordinating positions with the Russian side, even on the status of the territories of northern Syria, which until recently remained exclusively a subject of dialogue between Ankara and Washington, speaks about the evolution of the Astana mechanism for resolving the Syrian conflict.

Provided that the Turkish side can give tangible assurances that the proposed buffer zone does not turn into a US-Turkish protectorate over time, Moscow, following the spirit of cooperation, could approve the operation necessary for Turkey’s interests. At the same time, the parties must clearly define the physical parameters of the Turkish operation and determine the prospects for the political future of the territories within the framework of the political dialogue between the Syrian opposition and the government.

Further reading:


Vitaly Naumkin on Kurds, Turkey and constitutional committee in Syria

by RIA Novosti

At the end of last year, there was hope for the early start of the work of the Syrian constitutional committee, which would be the most important step towards a political settlement of the crisis in this country. However, this has not yet been achieved. Vitaly Naumkin, a former senior adviser to the special envoy of the UN secretary general for Syria, scientific director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, explained why it happened, why the United States prevented the launch of the Syrian political process, said what Washington fears in the Middle East, and predicted further developments amid the withdrawal of American troops from Syria.

- You have long been an adviser to Staffan de Mistura, but he resigned as special envoy for Syria. Is there any prospect that you will remain an adviser to the new envoy?

- I have ended the contract with the UN, now there is no status. I am not even familiar with the new envoy, and I do not know what format of work he will have. I think he will focus on advisors from European countries. Will not invite either Russian or American. Invite, think.

- What is generally known about the new special envoy - Geir Pedersen? What is his reputation in diplomatic and expert circles?

- The reputation of a strong, tough diplomat with extensive experience in the Middle East. He worked in conflict points, knows the Middle East. And in Palestine, and in Lebanon worked. Belonging to Norwegian diplomacy is always a part of peacemaking initiatives. Norway is known as the initiator of many negotiation actions. We can recall, for example, the reconciliatory Israeli-Palestinian process in Oslo. He is also involved in this.

He is a man of Western culture in any case, a man of the West. Any special envoy has his own program of action, his own ideas about the beautiful, but he, first, reports to the UN Security Council, and most importantly - will act, like the former, in accordance with the instructions of UN Secretary-General António Guterres. Therefore, to exaggerate its independence should not be.

- In December there was a ministerial meeting in Geneva of the countries-guarantors of the peace process (Russia, Iran, Turkey) and de Mistura. Then they failed to agree on a part of the list of the constitutional committee - a source in the Russian delegation told RIA Novosti that de Mistura was not satisfied with the list submitted by the guarantor countries. What is the essence of these contradictions and will it be possible to overcome them with a new special envoy?

- Difficulties have arisen with the so-called list number 3, which will represent the civil society in the committee. The first list is the official Damascus, the second - the opposition. Turkey basically helped the opposition to present its list - list number 2.

Civil society, besides the UN, was mainly engaged in Russia and Damascus. First, the Syrian government rejected a significant part of the people whom de Mistura proposed: they were first made proposals to the guarantor countries in closed order in Sochi. However, Damascus categorically disagreed with the proposals of de Mistura.

And the opinion of the guarantor countries, in particular, Russia, a key settlement partner, is such that everything must be coordinated with Damascus. Damascus - the legitimate government. Without taking into account the views of Damascus, without relying on his proposals can not do anything.

Damascus were proposed other candidates, it was discussed with the guarantor countries. But mistrust arose between de Mistura and the Syrian government.

There was a difficult negotiation process. Delegations traveled here and there, there were contacts, negotiations. Consensus was reached between the Syrian government and the guarantor countries. With this list came the guarantors to Geneva. But some candidates did not arouse enthusiasm for the special envoy.

The essence of the disagreement is what the weight of the loyalists will be in this constitutional committee. Naturally, the government would like the absolute majority of the members of the constitutional committee to either represent the government or be loyal to it.

The UN proceeds from the assumption that everything must be decided taking into account the opinions of those who are not among the loyalists. But after all, there is already a “second list” and the opposition is present in the committee, so the battle for people in the list of civil society reflects disputes over who will have the predominant influence.

However, the point is not only in the composition of the committee. There is still debate about the modality of his work. How it will work, how decisions will be made - by consensus or not by consensus, by a majority or not by a majority. But I think that all problems can be solved and a constitutional committee will be created.

It is also obvious that behind the rejection of the proposals, which were agreed with Russia, Iran and Turkey, stands the desire of some of our Western partners, first of all the USA, to disrupt this process altogether. The United States fears that the success of the constitutional process and the fact that it will cause real progress in a political settlement will lead to even greater enhancement of Russia's prestige in the Middle East and in the international community. Therefore, there are attempts to disrupt the process, tighten it and show that the guarantor countries fail, Russia fails. Such attempts have always been made and continue to be made.

- What will happen next with this list? Will you manage to coordinate it with a new special envoy?

- As I have already said, any special envoy acts in accordance with the instructions of the UN Secretary-General António Gutteresh. In the United Nations, the influence of the Western powers, primarily the United States, is strong enough. This is a reality to be reckoned with.

One way or another, without taking into account Russia's opinion, no decisions will be made. I believe that they will agree. Damascus does not nominate officials in the list number 3. There are one or two people who held positions in the government. One was a minister, but he resigned from his post and will be present on the committee as a representative of civil society, as an individual. There should be lawyers, experts who understand the constitutional law. This is a piece of goods.

It should be borne in mind that a large part of Syrian society is in different positions than the government, and it must also be represented. There should be some professionals, including neutral ones.

- Are the first and second parts of the committee already formed?

- Yes, they were formed. Everything is clear with Damascus - there are no problems here. And in the summer, the opposition presented its list, but at the last round of negotiations, it expressed dissatisfaction with certain people in its own list. It is clear that some puppeteer pulls the strings to disrupt the process. They themselves gave the list, then began to say that something was not agreed. These attempts at failure will be repaid, but the process was delayed.

But this is a responsible matter, it requires the consent of the parties. Well, there will not be a committee now, it will be postponed for another couple of months - I don’t see this as a tragedy. It should be borne in mind that the situation on the ground is taking shape in favor of the government forces and Russia, which are interested in stabilization. The level of violence is much less, some problems are solved. A number of regional states are ready to consider the issue of participation in the reconstruction of Syria. Advances in the return of refugees have been noted, several tens of thousands have already returned.

It is going towards stabilization and the restoration of Damascus control over an ever-increasing territory.

- What, in fact, will the constitutional committee do after its formation?

- There must be serious reforms in Syria itself. It is clear that there can be no return to the situation before 2011. The government should understand this. There must be a new management system. Decentralization, more rights for the provinces, regardless of their ethnic composition, is a very serious matter.

- Does Damascus itself understand the impossibility of returning to the pre-war situation?

- I know Syrians well, they are very smart people. And smart people are sitting in Damascus. I think they understand it. With a complete restoration of those orders that were before the start of the conflict, can not be. The country is entering a post-conflict phase. The task of our Syrian friends is to prevent the resumption of again these fierce clashes with the opposition.

The crushing blows inflicted on the terrorists, and the armed opposition has lost its force. More and more people are prone to lay down their arms and move on to a peaceful life. The task is to manage the country differently. It is necessary to give more rights to the population, more rights to the regions, to take into account the presence of protest sentiments, which must somehow be extinguished. It is necessary to go towards these people, to provide some kind of freedom. Provide more open, transparent elections. Because the constitution will be followed by elections, which should be held in accordance with the new rules.

The Kurdish question is an important and difficult task for any government in Syria. Kurds today de facto in the north of Syria have their own system of government. This system does not like the Turkish partners and is not recognized by Damascus. This is a contradiction that must be somehow resolved. But for the Kurds, who are used to self-governing during these conflict years, it is already difficult to return to the system, when all decisions in one hundred percent were made in Damascus. They believe that they played a huge role - and this is true - in breaking the IS *. They believe that their rights should be recognized, give more opportunities for self-expression, self-determination within the framework of Syrian statehood. At the same time, there can be no talk of any separatism.

Russian proposals for a draft constitution contain an obvious idea of ​​decentralization in Syria. A completely new system of granting large rights to the provinces, regions, including taking into account the aspirations of the Syrian Kurds, who used to feel like a discriminated minority.

There remains a serious problem with Idlib, with the intentions of Turkey. Their presence in Syria, according to Damascus, is illegal - no one invited them to send troops, neither the UN Security Council, nor the Syrian government. Relations between Turkey and Syria are tense, the Syrians view the Turks as aggressors and occupiers. We have a slightly different point of view. Moscow presumes that their presence there is illegitimate, but Turkey has its own concerns, which need to be taken into account related to their national security. All the more so to us, as a power, friendly Turkey. Turkey for us is one of the priority partners in the Middle East.

In addition, their presence in Syria is dictated, as they say, by the need to fight terrorists. The third thing that is taken into account is that they view their presence as temporary and say that in the future they will leave Syria. They advocate a united and indivisible Syria. For the preservation of the sovereignty of Damascus over the entire Syrian territory.

Our understanding in relation to the temporary Turkish presence there is related to the fact that promises have been made that Turkey will once leave it, having completed the tasks that it considers necessary.

Nevertheless, Russia is at odds with Turkey in relation to the Kurdish national self-defense units YPG. We do not consider them as terrorist entities, but Turkey regards them as terrorists and considers them to be a force that undermines the national security of Turkey itself. There is a contradiction.

- How can the Kurdish problem be solved? Can autonomy be created along the lines of neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan?

- No, I think that the Syrian government will not do this. Moreover, there is a difference between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian. Iraqi Kurdistan - the territory of the compact residence of the Kurds. In the Syrian Kurdistan, there are far more non-Kurds. Kurds are mixed with Arabs, Turkomans, Assyrians. They themselves emphasize: united Syria is indisputable for us, and northern Syria is a multi-ethnic zone, everyone here has equal rights.

Kurdish autonomy may not accept the local Arab population. Even those who are in opposition to Damascus. In general, there are many Arab nationalists in the Syrian opposition.

Of course, there must be some kind of decentralization, the regions have more rights. And not among some Kurds, but as they themselves say - Kurds along with Arabs and other groups of the population. Local councils, the decision of questions on public utilities, roads, construction, health care. That can be decided at the level of local authorities. But Syria will never accept the fact that Kurdish militia units will have the right to carry weapons, like the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, so I think this will be more limited autonomy, approved by Damascus. Such an idea was laid in the draft constitution, with which Russia spoke. But only Syrians themselves and their legitimate power can decide the fate of Syrian statehood.

- In December, information appeared that a delegation came to Moscow from Syrian Kurdistan. Did you happen to meet them?

- Purely met by chance.

- Mostly people associated with the YPG, with the people's self-defense units, with the self-government of Rozhava and the Democratic Union (PYD) party, which our Turkish friends consider a terrorist organization, and Russia does not consider them as such.

- Do you know if they had a meeting at the Foreign Ministry?

- Kurds represented in the lists of the constitutional committee?

- Kurds are generally represented everywhere. There are Kurds in the government list. There are Kurds in the opposition list, so the problem is not in Kurds in general, but in recognition of the largest party of Syrian Kurds - the Democratic Union Party, PYD. She is not on the lists of the constitutional committee, she was not in the negotiations in Geneva. And all the efforts to convince the Turkish partners to accept this party as the main representative of the Kurds of Northern Syria stumbled upon a complete rejection. Turkey does not want to put up with them, nor to negotiate, considering them enemies, terrorists.

- One could probably negotiate. And now, when the Americans left the Kurds, I think the Kurds will make some serious concessions to Damascus. They will move away from maximalist demands and negotiate. There is a chance.

- Taking into account all these contradictions in Syria, is a draft constitution possible that will suit everyone, including the Islamists of Idlib?

- Possible, why not. The constitution of 2012 is not at all bad. Another thing is that it was not sufficiently respected and needs at least changes - it is clear to everyone. Therefore, all agree on the need for a constitutional process. There is only disagreement about whether it should be a completely new constitution or be amended 2012 constitution.

There are states that are much more fragmented than Syria and live well within the constitution. And some without a constitution at all live - and also nothing, not a disaster. As for the groups in Idlib ... If you are talking about "Dzhebhat en-Nusra" *, then this group, according to international law, is recognized as terrorist. It is subject to liquidation. This does not mean that all thousands of militants must be killed, physically destroyed, they must be destroyed as an organization. Militants must be disarmed, prosecuted for their crimes and neutralized or destroyed.

By the way, Turkey was ready to fight only with the IS * some time ago, and “Dzhebhat an-Nusru” * avoided including them among its opponents. But then she equated "Dzhebhat an-Nusru" *, as the whole world community does, to the IG * and today expresses readiness to achieve the complete neutralization of this group.

- They will agree on a new constitution?

- Turks work with them. I think there is such hope. Tens of thousands of people - are you going to bomb them all in a row? They have families, children, women, old people.

- How will Trump’s decision to withdraw American soldiers from Syria affect the situation?

- We still do not know how it will be, whether it will be one hundred percent care or not. There is a very serious negotiation process on all tracks. Trump believes that he fulfilled the goal of eliminating the IG *. He believes that the task of overthrowing Assad is not facing America. Americans still believe that "Assad should go," but they will not be overthrown by force. But they still have the task of ousting Iran from Syria. And in this matter, they merge with Israel. But what they will do for this is unclear.

We also have serious differences with Israel, despite the fact that Israel has recently been our reliable partner. Relationships develop great, brilliantly. Contacts at the highest level. Works deconflicting. The parties inform each other about their future actions. Nevertheless, there is disagreement about the actions of Israel in Syria. Recently, Israeli planes, passing through the territory of Lebanon, hit the suburbs of Damascus, which, from our point of view, is unacceptable.

The strike is not inflicted on Syria, but on Iranian formations on the territory of Syria. This is not easier, especially since the Iranians are present in Syria legally, they were invited by the Syrian government. Their presence there is not a violation of international law. And what Israel does is a violation of international law, a violation of the sovereignty of the Syrian airspace. Israel believes that it has the right to defend itself by committing such actions. It is necessary to negotiate, therefore, apparently, the difficult diplomatic process will continue.

There are such nightmarish scenarios, one of which is based on suspicion of Trump that he will leave now, will bring all Americans out of Syria, and his allies will leave as well. And then someone again will make a provocation with chemical weapons, which Assad will attribute, and then the Americans will deliver a massive strike on targets in Syria itself. Maybe in an hour warning us that our advisers leave the territory of the command posts of the Syrian Defense Ministry and the place of deployment of large military units. Such suspicions exist in a number of experts. And all the talk is a cover, and the challenge is to strike at the Iranians. And, on the other hand, dump the government in Syria. But what will happen then? Chaos? What does Trump want? It is not clear.

- Is this scenario really fantastic?

- No, he is not really fantastic. Anything can happen. And who will take the place of Americans, it is difficult to say. Arab forces? I think the Syrian army, with the support of Russia, will do everything to put the territory east of the Euphrates under its control. It is very important economically.

* Terrorist groups banned in Russia

For further reading:

Alexander Dugin: Principles and strategy of the coming war

by Alexander Dugin

War of the Continents: Hot Stage

In a sense, the war is already underway. War is always. The war that is most important now is the confrontation of two civilizations — the land civilization represented by Russia and the civilization of the Sea embodied in the USA. On a spiritual level, it is a battle of spirit and matter, of light and darkness, of God and the devil.

The confrontation between the poles of reality - between good and evil, the trading system and the heroic civilization, between Carthage and Rome, Athens and Sparta is not removable. But at some point it reaches the hot stage. Today is just such a moment.

We are balancing on the brink of that war, which is. But that at any moment can become the main and, probably, the only content of our life. Since the main players - the United States and Russia - are powers possessing vigorous weapons, this war concerns all the peoples of the earth. She has a chance to become the end of humanity. Of course, this is not yet fatal, but such a turn of affairs cannot be excluded.

The spiritual plan of the great opposition is conceptualized in specific terms and in a particular context. And here the balance of power is always in favor of the Light, regardless of the position in which the faithful are. But at the strategic level, things may look different.

The roles in this war are not symmetrical. Russia is in a weaker position, but is trying to return to the status of a global player. It merely seeks to regain its potential of a regional power that freely disposes of itself in the zone immediately adjacent to its borders. But this is unacceptable for the United States, which - in spite of everything - is still a global hegemon and is not going to give up on unipolarity voluntarily.

If we take into account what the spiritual background of this war is, it will become clear: darkness does not allow the presence of light in any proportion, it will not calm down only when it can beat the light everywhere - not only globally but also locally, because one ray is enough to make darkness, darkness, without it, it can impersonate anything.

Hence the important conclusion: the global claims of the modern materialist technocratic West, globalism itself, is not an accident, but the essence of the force with which we are dealing. It would be naive to believe that you can agree with the devil or deceive him. He can only win. This is the law of spiritual warfare.

Today he comes, and we retreat. Therefore, the war is deployed almost on our territory - in the zone of our direct national interests. With all that Russia is trying to go beyond its borders today, this war is defensive for us.

At the moment, we do not set any goals other than regional ones. However, their implementation is hampered by the world nuclear power. This complicates the situation and takes the conflict to the global level. In any case: we are attacked, we defend. It is important.

Consider now the fronts of this war.

Front number 1. Syria

From the very beginning of the Syrian conflict, Moscow supported Bashar Assad, against which Washington, Western Europe and the Middle East proxies of the United States - Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey - played, each of these countries, however, pursued its own personal interests.

Radical Islamic groups - ISIS, al-Qaeda (Al Nusra Front), etc. - became the instrument for overthrowing Assad. However, Russia fully joined the military operation only in 2015, when it rendered a serious and open military support to the weakened Assad.

In this situation, Moscow received its allies in the face of the Shiite axis - Tehran-Shiite Iraqi-Lebanese Hezbollah, with whom we are not just cooperating, but fighting side by side. The Shiite world is strictly anti-American oriented, but at the same time, at the regional level, it opposes the radical Sunism of the Saudis and Qatar, sponsoring Salafi extremist groups.

On Front No. 1, Russia faces the United States and NATO countries not directly, but indirectly. The countries of the West themselves are also fighting with ISIL in words, although in fact they strongly support radical Islamic groups to overthrow Assad. The same tactic was used in the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya. In addition, the presence of Salafi jihadists in Iraq, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan, justifies the presence of American troops there.

Therefore, Front No. 1 is a life-challenge for Russia: the United States and NATO are indirectly fighting against us, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are almost openly fighting. Therefore, the war in Syria can in no way be considered an ordinary anti-terrorist operation: in addition to the fact that the Salafis now control most of Syria, they have a huge direct and indirect support.

But Russia is a nuclear power. Therefore, its involvement in the Syrian war dramatically changes the situation, withdrawing it from the local to the global level. Once we are there, then we have put a lot on the map. And now the matter is not only in Asad, his enemies will be forced to fight with Russia. But the opposite is true: we challenged not the extremist network of ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, but of American hegemony and Middle Eastern Salafism, which has serious bases in the richest oil-money monarchies in the Gulf.

It is important here: how much Moscow understands the seriousness of the situation on Front No. 1 and how far we are ready to go into a situation that is already a real full-fledged tough war with an impressive coalition on the opposite side of the front. After all, the United States and NATO are exactly there, whatever they may proclaim.

Front number 2. Turkey

As the Syrian war got under way, we, by objective laws, clashed with Turkey, which essentially occupied the northern territories of Syria inhabited by Turkish tribes and entered into a military conflict with the Syrian Kurds. Erdogan long ago established an alliance with the richest Qatar, funding Salafi groups (like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) and began an active struggle against Assad.

Therefore, when the Russian military in Syria began bombing the positions of the Salafis in the north of Syria, we entered into a direct clash with Ankara. The downed military aircraft and the brutally murdered Russian pilot were only a reason for escalation. When we began to act decisively, and getting involved in the conflict we simply could not act differently, the war with Turkey became a very real prospect.

This was followed by the rupture of trade relations, the ban on tourism and the expulsion of Turkish construction companies, which from an economic point of view, was the strongest painful blow to Turkey and led to billions of dollars in losses.

Ankara constantly threatens to close the Bosphorus for Russian ships, and this is equivalent to cutting the vital artery for our contingent in Latakia. The Turks have transferred in recent weeks a significant part of the troops from the border with Greece to the border with Syria, which can be regarded as a preparation for a military invasion. All this greatly increases the risk of a new Russian-Turkish war.

How likely is it?

More likely than ever in the twentieth century and in the first decades of the XXI. Front number 2 is already open.

When he burns, no one can tell for sure. Theoretically - at any moment. Here again it is worth remembering that Turkey is a member of NATO and that in one way or another it coordinates its actions on Syria with Washington. This means that in a possible war with Russia on the side of Turkey - as in the era of the Crimean War - there will again be a broad Western coalition led by the United States. Therefore, again: regional conflict will obviously have a global scale. Moreover, in Turkey there is an American military base with nuclear weapons. The war with Turkey can hardly turn into the Third World War.

Front number 3. Ukraine

No one in the world recognized reunion with the Crimea.

DNR and LC remain a bleeding wound with an unknown status.

Poroshenko's positions in Kiev are rather fragile, and it is even theoretically impossible to fundamentally correct the economic and social situation in Ukraine. Therefore, at a certain moment, Kiev will have only one way to go - a new round of escalation of tension in the East and even an invasion of the Crimea.

If Ukraine in this situation was alone with Russia, it would be suicide for Kiev.

But again, the US and NATO factors should be taken into account. It is the West that is behind the coup in Kiev in the winter of 2014. And at some point a consolidated attack on the militia positions of Novorossia and even on the Crimea by the Ukrainian army can be quite likely. And for intra-Ukrainian reasons, and to an even greater degree according to the logic of the global confrontation between Russia and the United States.

Note that all three fronts are located in close proximity to our borders in the zone separating Eurasia and Russia, the continental space of the Eurasian Heartland, from the western territories. This is an area where civilizations converge, East and West.

As a rule, because of the dispute around precisely such territories, world wars and global conflicts began. All three fronts are located in the space of the former Ottoman Empire, because we won back from the Turks both Novorossia and the Crimea, and it was the Ottoman Empire that once included Syria. Earlier this was the space of the Orthodox-Byzantine world. So these three fronts have a huge historical and civilizational washed away.

Now we turn to the internal problems of Russia. Here we see three more fronts.

Front number 4. Salafi terrorism inside Russia

The network structures of radical Islam, tied to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, have long been deployed in Russia itself - both in the North Caucasus and in other areas. As the influx of the Islamic population into large Russian cities and the capital grows, these networks spread everywhere and entangle the entire space of Russia in varying degrees. They are not limited to the compact zone of Muslims, but actively expand the zone of influence in other social environments.

Using a variety of internal problems, radical Sunni Islam is gradually becoming quite popular as an alternative to the vague and sluggish ideological agenda of official Moscow and its purely conformist representatives in the regions. This creates a breeding ground for training and educating terrorist groups and direct branches of ISIL (a terrorist group banned in the Russian Federation).

If, technically, special services are more or less coping with the task of containing these groups, the strategic plan and, moreover, the ideological program to combat these phenomena are completely absent, which will eventually

Front number 4 is extremely relevant. This Front No. 4 was in fact the field of hot war in the period of the First and Second Chechen companies, the turning point in the Second of them was achieved only by turning to a rigidly patriotic line in domestic politics. any weakening of such national discourse automatically strengthens centrifugal currents and extremist groups again.

Front number 4 is open and operational, although we do not fully know the scale of the problem: in order not to sow panic among the population, special services hide from people the number of prevented attacks and other preventive measures, which, in fact, is impressive even today.

Since the United States and external centers, American proxies in the Middle East, are behind this Front No. 4, serious financial and, most importantly, logistical support for the new escalation can be expected here as well.

Front number 5. The fifth column

This Front is a network of opposition circles, whose core consists of pro-American liberals who dream of returning in the 1990s, in the era of open plunder of Russia and selling all its assets abroad, and the absolute power of liberal elites, and whose cannon fodder are the radical nationalists and Russian neo-Nazis, dissatisfied with the Russian government and its passive policies regarding growing migration, as well as slurring or a complete lack of a national idea.

Liberals alone are not enough for organizing weighty and large-scale protests, so the radical Russian nationalists in this coalition are carrying out the 5th column of the mass support function. But it is the pro-American liberals that are the main center, where coordination efforts and key decisions are made, responsible for contacts with Washington.

The United States itself officially supports “democratic” movements, allocating significant amounts from the budget to them. But funding from other, less transparent sources of the Russian fifth column is several times greater than the data that are voiced openly. On Bolotnaya Square in the spring of 2012, the fifth column showed what it can do.

In the event of an exacerbation of the situation and in the face of the consequences of sanctions and possible military conflicts, Front No. 5 may become a significant factor in weakening Russia. This preparatory backstamp can be decisive at all in the event that the inefficiency of the administrative system (and nothing in Russia portends that it will become more effective in the near future) accumulate costs. Under certain circumstances, Front No. 5 may be joined by a part of disgruntled and disillusioned inhabitants, which will create a serious threat.

Front number 6. Pro-Western agents of influence and power liberals

This group has recently been called the “sixth column”. We are talking about those liberals and Westerners who were integrated into power in the 2000s or have remained there since the 1990s, adopting new rules of the game.

In contrast to the fifth column, the representatives of the sixth column are formally completely loyal to the authorities, obediently obey it and act in the spirit of complete conformity.

However, the sixth column shares the Western view of things, sees the United States and NATO - the vanguard of progressive humanity, in the economy is guided exclusively by liberal methods and approaches.

Often the state and families of senior Russian officials are also in the West.

In such a situation, loyalty and forced hypocritical patriotism hide an orientation towards consistent sabotage of state sovereignty, restraining sovereign ideology, economic, administrative and informational strategies, leading eventually to demoralization of society, weakening the economy and further de-ideologization of the population.

Front number 6 consists of systematic, deliberate and extremely skillful sabotage of the Russian revival, deterrence and substitution of truly patriotic reforms, the creation of skilled simulacra and fakes.

"The sixth column" in their views is no different from the fifth and is also focused on the West, but only hides it, preferring to strike at the regime from the inside rather than from the outside. And just like the fifth column, the sixth column is controlled from the external center, from Washington, although this is more subtle and nuanced than in the case of the “fifth column”.

The coordination of Front No. 6 is managed by the American Council on International Relations (CFR), whose structures are almost officially represented on the highest floors of the Russian government. In general, most of the “government liberals”, as well as a significant segment of other government institutions, belong to this type.

Synchronize fronts: Washington's likely strategy

Now put yourself in the shoes of American strategists.

The escalation of relations between the United States and NATO with Russia is evident. Moscow blows itself in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, with the Crimea and Novorossia in 2014 and, finally, with Syria in 2015 as a sovereign regional power, if necessary, by force insisting on its national interests in a strictly delineated zone.

This is incompatible with the continuation of American hegemony, which is still global. Moscow would have to build its policy in coordination with Washington and NATO, and naturally, it would never have received sanctions for all of the above actions.

So, despite external politeness and liberal rhetoric, Russia is getting out of control of the West. It is a fact. And Washington must respond to this fact in some way.

If he acknowledges this, it will be tantamount to giving up hegemony. But having begun to crumble, the American Empire will not necessarily stop at those frontiers that it still confidently controls today.

Encouraged by the success of the Russians, anyone might want to try the Americans for strength.

Therefore, in place of Washington strategists, it would be logical to activate all 6 fronts. Moreover, in all six cases America will not act with its own hands: even the worst outcome will not deal a fatal blow to it, as it is reliably protected by a huge European, North-African zone, beyond which is the Atlantic, and from the East - by the Pacific Ocean (especially that in the eastern direction from Russia there are no active movements).

Moreover, it would be quite reasonable to synchronize the strikes on Russia from all sides - in Syria from the side of the militants, to support Turkey, to push the Kiev punishers to a new wave of hostilities (and the attack on the Crimea), to bring the domestic Salafi terrorist structures into combat readiness support the fifth column (finding a suitable social reason) and put the next sanctions ultimatum to the “sixth column” so that they engage in sabotage more actively and more painfully.

At the same time, from the outside it would be just as logical, on the one hand, to maintain and even strengthen the sanctions, lower oil prices for a certain percentage, and at the same time begin to attack the Russian leadership with conciliatory CFR-like trolling - they say, “The West will help you "," Terrorists are our common problem "(common because they are at war with them, while others are arming them) and" the main problem is China "(" let the Russians give up their nuclear weapons, and we will put our ") etc.

But behind these simple analytical calculations lies something very serious. War. This hot war with the sea of ​​blood, fires, torture, suffering and pain. A war in which we all have to participate. And since three of the six Fronts are internal, it is likely that external war will be accompanied by civil war. That, however, we know perfectly well from our history.

Winning strategy: internal enemy

Imagine that we fairly objectively evaluated and weighed the risks and our analysis is correct. What to do in this situation? Entering a war, or at least approaching a war closely, we must not only react situationally, but also have some plan - both waging and winning. To wish for victory is quite logical, isn't it? It remains only to think of ways to achieve it. Even in purely theoretical terms.

It is completely obvious that it is possible to effectively wage war against an external enemy only if society is sufficiently consolidated and mobilized internally. It is desirable that it would be morally ready for war. For this, it must understand who the enemy is, and who is the friend, and most importantly, why this is so, and not otherwise. You can not start demonizing the enemy at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. The image of the enemy must be formed in advance and knowingly.

Therefore, the first task of preparing for victory would be a real full-fledged company to create an entirely negative, monstrous, satanic (that is, true) image of the United States and the West as a whole.

It's time to call a spade a spade. The West is the place where the devil fell. This is the center of the global capitalist octopus. It is a matrix of rotten culture of perversions and vice, lies and cynicism, violence and hypocrisy.

In part, this is already under way in modern Russia, but since this case is entrusted to the “sixth column”, instead of revealing the true demonic essence of the modern West, we have a caricature, something miserable and little convincing. This is the effect of the sabotage that constitutes the essence of Front No. 6. His fighters do not refuse to carry out orders from the authorities, they even ask for more and more, but turn their execution into a farce, fooling and subtly discrediting all undertakings.

Awkward and insincere propaganda, in which those who make it do not believe, often gives the opposite effect.

Therefore, the formation of the image of the American enemy and his satellites (with which we actually have to fight), it would be logical to instruct those who believe that, who understands the satanism of the West and who is able to bring this with maximum clarity and persuasiveness to the sleeping masses.

In the meantime, the West has been instructed to criticize agents of the influence of the West itself. With a predictable result. This approach is incompatible with the “strategy of victory” and needs to be reconsidered (if we want to have at least a chance to win in the coming war).

From the first point the following follows logically. It is necessary to dismantle the structures of the “sixth column” in the shortest possible time, removing the liberals and Westerners from all key posts. Together with them, liberalism in the economy will be abolished, which will allow:

  •  establish national control over the Central Bank,
  •  to abandon the dollar by switching to a foreign exchange activity for another reserve currency (for example, the yuan),
  •  achieve full financial sovereignty
  •  move to a mobilization economy according to the logic of wartime conditions.
  • In parallel, it is necessary to form a National Committee on the Media, which will restructure the information work in accordance with emergency requirements.

The effectiveness of the purely destructive activity of the “fifth column” is largely connected with the effectiveness of the “sixth column” sabotage. Front number 5 and Front number 6 are inextricably linked. Therefore, the dismantling of the sixth column inside the government will sharply weaken the “fifth column”, whose leaders in emergency conditions could either be interned (by the way, measures for the house arrest of individual leaders have already been applied), or sent.

Needless to say, any legal means of disseminating liberal or destructive nationalist propaganda should be outlawed.

Front number 4 is a problem because of the absence of any ethno-national policy in the State. At the moment, the same “sixth column” or cognitively inadequate bureaucrats are busy with this issue. That is why bureaucracy gets away from real challenges from uncontrolled migration and interethnic and interfaith tensions in our conditions and empty slogans about “civil society” and “tolerance”.

Without a coherent system of ethno-national strategy, the issue of Islamic extremism and terrorism in Russia cannot be resolved. Power measures alone are not enough, it is necessary to abolish or irreversibly change the social environment itself. Force operations to combat terrorist fundamentalism must be correlated with a large-scale — including ideological — model of ethno-national policy.

Winning strategy: external enemy

In Ukraine, Front No. 3 should be ready for armed provocations from Kiev and give them adequate resistance. Sooner or later, Russia will have to radically resolve the issue with Novorossia, since it’s somewhat irresponsible to hope that Kiev will fall by itself or abandon its pro-American and anti-Russian policies.

To effectively defend the Crimea and resolve the issue with the Donbas, it is necessary to free up the entire space of Novorossia, and if the war is inevitable, Moscow will have only one task - to win it as soon as possible and as efficiently as possible. The creation of a friendly Russia zone from Odessa to Kharkov, either as a separate State or with the inclusion of these native Russian lands in Russia, is the goal, the achievement of which could be considered a victory. No less important is the fate of Central Ukraine.

Kiev for Russian self-consciousness is a pole of historical existence. Despite the fact that representatives of the pro-Western oligarchic elite, relying on the Russophobic ideology of the Westerners, were temporarily entrenched in it, Kiev is an integral part of the Russian world. We cannot stand for the truth and leave it to the enemy. He must be released and returned to the people.

The fate of Western Ukraine without the East and Kiev will not play much importance. These lands have fallen away from the Russian world for too long, and we can hardly hope to soon return them to the context of the Orthodox civilization. But the greater our success in the struggle for the Russian world, the greater the chance that the situation will change in the western regions of Ukraine.

Turkish Front №2. Here, in addition to developing military operations, which represent the task of the military leadership of the country and cannot be a matter for analysts, attention should be paid to two main factors: the political opposition to the Erdogan regime, which in current conditions is becoming a natural ally of Russia, and the fundamental problem that for Ankara are the Kurds.

Both factors are key to success in the Russian-Turkish conflict. It should be extremely thoughtful to conduct anti-Turkish propaganda in Russian society, constantly emphasizing that the United States and their accomplice Erdogan are responsible for the escalation of relations, and that the Turks are not considered by Moscow as a historical enemy.

Therefore, any parallels with the Russian-Turkish wars - even for internal use - will only rally the Turks around Erdogan and strengthen the enemy. And on the contrary, the outstretched hand of friendship to those politicians of Turkey who do not share the views of Herodogan and Neo-Ottomanism Davut-oglu could be decisive. In parallel, of course, interaction with the Kurds should be intensified, since this is an impressive force in Turkey itself.

Finally, Front number 1 - Syria. We did not accidentally put it at the end of the “winning strategy”. The most acute form of confrontation is always the most practical and full of technical and military details. But everything private always depends on society, and local successes depend on external, often global, conditions.

We have seen that here we have an important regional ally - the Shiite world, represented primarily by Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. These are our brothers in arms, and we must in every way deepen this alliance. It is important to support Shiites in Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia itself. Obviously, not only we understand the full significance of the Russian-Shiite strategic alliance, and therefore pro-American forces both in Russia and in Iran will try to do everything possible to sow discord among the allies. This should be nipped in the bud - at least in Russia, and right at this point dotted i in negotiations with Shiites.

Further, we need political, and preferably military and economic support of countries belonging to the intended multipolar club - BRICS. China plays a special role here, preferring not to go to the first line in the confrontation of the United States, but is ready to support Moscow in it, while remaining on the sidelines. A great deal in Syria now depends on Moscow-Beijing relations, and maximum attention should be paid to this one. Moreover, China is beginning to act more actively in the military-strategic area on the African continent, starting to create the first military bases there.

We have no chance to make European countries our full-fledged allies in Syria: the US has too much influence on them. But Moscow will benefit from any distancing from Washington of the European powers (first of all, France, Germany and Italy), disagreements in NATO. If the wave of right-conservative parties and movements loyal to Russia as a whole continues to grow in Europe, this will significantly strengthen our position in Syria itself. Russian propaganda in Europe in wartime conditions is of particular importance.

Since we are confronted in Syria with the forces that Saudi Arabia and Qatar openly support, especially since Qatar was involved in the bombing of the plane with Russian tourists over Sinai, we should pay particular attention to the maximum destabilization of the respective regimes.

Under certain circumstances, direct attacks on Qatar and the military support of the Hussites in Yemen, as well as the Shiites of Bahrain, cannot be ruled out. Strategically decisive would be inviting Russian troops to the governments of Iraq and Lebanon; this will make it possible to launch a full-scale war against the main bases of Islamic terrorists of ISIL and cut off their infrastructural links with Turkey and the Gulf countries.

On the whole, Russia is already in a war in the Middle East, therefore we should recognize this as a fait accompli and urgently reanimate the entire arsenal of available means - first and foremost, intellectual and network ones, aimed at promoting Russian interests in this region in various ways. , economics, ideologies, etc.

The final argument in this war will be the presence of nuclear weapons, which, thank God, did not have time to destroy the liberal reformers in the 90s. Its meaning is to never use it. But this means that it imposes severe restrictions on our main opponent - the United States of America. Under the fear of total annihilation, the United States will be obliged to play against us according to certain rules.

Front number 7. Americans vs Federal Government

In addition, with regard to the United States, Front No. 7 should be opened. The point is that within the United States there are many dissatisfied with the rule of those elite who profess globalist ideology, drawing the United States into bloody wars, destroying traditional European Christian identity.

New America, in which there is nothing actually American and which serves the interests of the world financial oligarchy, which has neither culture nor identity, destroys Old America.

Therefore, the support of American traditionalism and conservatism, of American identity is an important task for Russia. Our ally in the USA is the American people. In addition, many contradictions have accumulated in the social sphere, in inter-ethnic relations. A significant part of American society does not accept complete moral degeneration. The federal government uses every convenient excuse to begin the process of repealing the second amendment to the Constitution, which allows the Americans to carry weapons.

The constantly growing in proportions, the Latin population, mainly Catholic, introduces a new identity into American society, which is not at all hostile to Russia. Russia must actively engage in the struggle for influence on American society, strengthen the explanation of Russia's spiritual position in this war, show that Russians and Americans have a common enemy - a manic satanic elite who usurped power and leading all of humanity - including Americans themselves. to an imminent catastrophe.

The fruits of the affairs of this elite on the face - the entire Middle East is already drenched in blood, no longer coping with the establishment of any order, the globalist elite (CFR, neocons, representatives of the global financial oligarchy, Wall Street) implants everywhere only chaos, destruction, and pain. The destruction of this cancer of humanity is the work of all of us, including the Americans themselves, who are not only its tools, but also the victims.

Where is the city?

Winning this game will not be easy. Because the name of this game is Big War. But nevertheless, when the Great War came, it can be avoided only at the cost of slavery and the deliberate recognition of oneself as a loser. This has never happened in Russian history. No matter how difficult it was for us, we coped every time.

It is not just a geopolitical confrontation, a redistribution of spheres of influence, or ensuring national interests. It is about something much deeper and more important.

All religions have a section dedicated to the end of time and the final battle. Christians, as well as Jews and Muslims, associate the events of this cycle with the Great War. And invariably in all these three religions the place of this Great War is the Middle East, the Armageddon field, as well as the territories adjacent to it. For Muslims, Damascus - the Umayyad Mosque - is considered the place where the Second Coming of Christ will take place.

Therefore, the war in Syria has a frankly eschatological sense.

After all, Syria is a part of the Holy Land, on which the foot of the Savior walked. For the Jews awaiting the coming of Moshiach, the escalation of violence on their borders in areas critical to the very existence of the State of Israel also cannot but have eschatological significance.

American dispensational Protestant Protestants see the script of the Last Battle as an invasion of the army of the northern country of Gog (interpreted as Russia) on the Holy Land. And finally, the Athos monks and Greek saints — such as Cosmas Aeolian [ 1]  or the elder Paisius the Holy Trinity — repeatedly predicted the release of Constantinople by the Russian troops and the disintegration of Turkey. So, St. Arseny of Cappadocia in Faras told the believers that they would lose their fatherland, but will soon regain it ” [2 ] :“ There will be another foreign army. She will not know Greek, but will believe in Christ. They will also ask: where is the City? ”. This was clearly understood as an indication of the Russian army approaching Constantinople. In one of the conversations the elder Paisius the Holy Trinity said:

“- Know that Turkey will fall apart. There will be a war that will last two halves. We will be winners, because we are Orthodox.

- Heronda, will we bear the damage in the war?

 E, at most, one or two islands will occupy, and we will be given Constantinople. See, see! ” [3]

More recently, one or two years ago, all these predictions would cause only a puzzled shrug - tales. But ... today: a lot of blood is flowing throughout the Middle East; fighting is under way around Damascus; Russians are not just present, but they are fighting in the Holy Land; the conflict with Turkey is heating up and it cannot be ruled out that this will lead to a real war. From the point of view of eschatology, the time comes to return our shrines - the Holy Land, Constantinople, Kiev. The statement that we do not live in the "Last Times" today looks unscientific. As the old man Paisiy used to say - “See, see!” And we will see.

So where is the City?

1  Athanasius Zoitakis. The Life and Prophecies of Cosmas Aetolia M., 2007.
2 ιριστόδουλος Αγιορείτης, ιερομοναχος. Σκέυος Εκλογής. Γιον Όρος, 1996.
3 . Athanasius Rakovalis "Father Paisius told me ...". M., 2003.

Further reading: